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Figure and affect in Collins
‘With my heart in my mouth’
Established critical commentary on Victorian sensation fiction has long
assimilated the depiction of sensation to the production of bodily
effects. These effects are sometimes understood as involuntary responses
to narrative stimuli, as though the representation of blackmail, bigamy,
adultery, murder, theft, impersonation, and the other unconventional
acts that form the thematic core of the genre gave rise, like pornography,
to predictable physiological events. At other times, they are understood to
add up to a generalized state of nervousness that, as D.A. Miller argues,
becomes a necessary condition for reading the psychosomatic mechanisms
that otherwise work to resist the interpretation of sensation’s embodiment
as the expression of normative violence.1 Criticism, in either case, has
tended to focus on what sensation fiction does rather than on how it
does it. Readings that focus on the hybridity of the form – a form
that combines elements of realism, romance, melodrama, and the
gothic – fail to account for the genre’s ability to produce sensation.
Indeed, the formal features usually adduced to make the case for its sen-
sationalism – the subordination of character to plot; a plot structure
organized around a secular mystery; the use of multiple narrators; accel-
erated storytelling pace; the deployment of detection as a general narrative
logic; etc. – may well serve as a structural analogues to the agitated body
of the reader, but provide no functional rationale for how it might
produce such a body.2 Nor do historicist attempts to situate sensation
fiction within the culture of sensationalism emergent in the 1860s, a
culture, as Lynn Pykett notes, for which ‘events’ both private and public
had become a spectacle,3 provide sufficient grounds for demonstrating
how the literary representation of scandal could give rise to the bodily
effects such accounts assume it produces. To be sure, the 1856 Police
Bill Act and the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act (the two laws most com-
monly cited in these accounts) were instrumental in opening up the
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private sphere to public scrutiny by placing domestic disputes under the
jurisdiction of civil courts and its police apparatus, but this new interest
in scandal does not in itself constitute a new order of sensation, and, if
it did, it is not clear how fictional narrative could reproduce it as sensation
other than by referring to it thematically.4 Similarly, cultural materialist
descriptions of the conditions of production, dissemination, and consump-
tion of sensation fiction provide valuable empirical evidence that sheds
light on the nature and extent of Victorians’ predilection for strong sen-
sations, but they tend to bracket the question of sensation’s own materiality
in their attempt to situate the effects of sensation in, say, advertising prac-
tices or serial methods of publication without considering that to do so is
to confuse sensationalism with sensation.5 In short, we know a lot about
the effects of sensation fiction, its physiology, psychology, and sociology,
but surprisingly little about its status as event.
Criticism’s resistance to theorize sensation as an event is striking not
least because sensation fiction has always been conceived of as an eventful
genre, its busy narratives responding to and reflecting broad social invest-
ments in the event. Writing in 1862, Margaret Oliphant described sen-
sation fiction in these terms: ‘We who once did, and made, and declared
ourselves masters of all things, have relapsed into the natural size of human-
ity before the great events which have given a new character to the age . . .
[I]t is only natural that art and literature should, in an age which has turned
out to [be] one of events, attempt a kindred depth of effect and shock of
incident’.6 Here, Oliphant is offering a shrewd cultural reading of what
had already been identified as one of sensation fiction’s most troubling
generic characteristics – its attention to incident. In a review of 1863,
H.L. Mansel based his attack on sensation fiction on the grounds that,
as a genre, it ‘abounds in incident’, adding that the ‘human actors in the
piece are, for the most part, but so many lay-figures on which to exhibit
a drapery of incident’.7 That the ‘eventness’ of sensation fiction should
have inspired from the outset some of the most virulent attacks on the
genre, need not, however, prevent us from acknowledging it as its first prin-
ciple of composition. When Wilkie Collins claims in the 1861 preface to
the second edition of The Woman in White (1860) that ‘the effect produced
by any narrative of events is essentially dependent, not on the events them-
selves, but on the human interest which is directly connected with them’,
he is defending the ‘old-fashioned opinion’ that a work of fiction should be
primarily concerned with telling a story and he is doing so by being defen-
sive about the public’s perception of sensation fiction’s eventness.8 The
association of sensation fiction with its eventness is in any case strong
enough in the public imaginary that, seven years later, Collins feels
obliged to make a further defence, which is included in the preface to
the first edition of The Moonstone (1868): ‘In some of my former novels,
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the object proposed has been to trace the influence of circumstance upon
character. In the present story I have reversed the process. The attempt
made, here, is to trace the influence of character on circumstance’.9
In part, the resistance derives from the fact that most accounts of sen-
sation fiction take for granted that the production of sensation is the exclu-
sive work of representation. To be sure, sensation fiction, like the realism
within whose parameters it operates, invites its readers to experience the life
of its characters as though it were their own. The opposition established
between character and event in the criticism of the genre tends to privilege
the former even if the terms, as in Collins’s odd chiasmus in the preface to
The Moonstone, are themselves linked by their capacity to represent (or, as
Collins put it, ‘trace the influence of’) each other. To maintain that events
should be valued on account of their ‘human interest’, therefore, is to
imply that character and reader alike are subject to their ‘influence’. It is
also true that sensation fiction, in having invented detection as a narrative
device, inaugurated one of the most enduring methods used in modern
literature to accomplish this form of identification. Emblematized in the
figure of the professional detective [most famously, Inspector Bucket in
Dickens’s Bleak House (1852–1853) and Sergeant Cuff in Collins’s The
Moonstone], detection is in fact a diffusive function carried out by many
different characters that, in its resemblance to reading, creates a virtual
network of identifications through or by which the reader can be made
to enter the world of the novel as one more participant in it.10 It differs
from other devices that perform a similar function of identification in
the realist novel – omniscience, free indirect style – in that detection is
closely associated with raw sensation, as opposed to, say, sentiment or
emotion, with which we tend to associate the more canonical novelistic
genres. Similarly, the notion that detective fiction exercises our cognitive
or analytical capacity is a red herring: sensation, not ratiocination, is
what delivers us to the ‘whodunit’ (with the emphasis on the ‘doing’)
insofar as we are guided through a problem at whose solution we could
never by ourselves arrive.11 What is not often acknowledged, in other
words, is that the logic of identification in sensation fiction is based
upon a principle of discovery (common to both reading and detection)
according to which readers and characters alike experience the same
bodily effects (accelerated pulse, bated breath, tingling in the hands,
what have you) by virtue of having been exposed to the same order of
events.12 We catch ‘detective fever’ much in the same way that Gabriel Bet-
teredge catches it in The Moonstone: ‘I followed him (with my heart in my
mouth)’ (p. 160).13
This mode of identification is not necessarily mediated by the practice
of interpretation unlike other, more complex emotive responses to litera-
ture that arise from the representation of events that do not in themselves
Mario Ortiz-Robles Figure and Affect in Collins
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appeal to our nervous system. In contrast, the self-reflexive nature of
affective discourse in George Eliot’s Middlemarch, for instance, creates
identification by making the cognitive processing of emotion a principle
of figural composition (the decoding of complex images – a pier glass, a
microscope – is also an attempt at elucidating complex feelings) as well
as the subject matter of its fiction (Dorothea’s story as sentimental
Bildung). Affect, in this case, is a precondition for emotion or, at least, a
subsidiary event. Rei Terada makes a useful distinction between affect
and emotion: ‘Feelings is a capacious term that connotes both physiological
sensations (affects) and psychological states (emotions)’.14 The fact that
sensation provides a more immediate means of identification than the con-
ventional or cognitive modes of feeling (sentiment and emotion) precisely
because it appears to be unmediated by its representations suggests that
sensation should be considered an event in its own right. Only to the
degree that sensation is an event, can sensation fiction be said to
produce sensation, not as a result of a representation of sensation nor,
for that matter, of its elaboration into complex emotions, but rather as a
disruption in the very order of representation. The narrative devices
usually associated with the production of sensation (surprises, interrup-
tions, reversals, enigmas, thrills, chills, and spills) should be understood
as narrative events rather than structural analogies to the shock endured
by the reading body, or, if they are that, they are only analogous on
account of their eventness. But what is the nature of these events? How
does sensation come about?.
These considerations are not only of methodological interest,
however; the stakes are theoretical as well as historical and have to do
with the cultural, ideological, and ethical fate of the subject, and indeed
its own status as subject. The analysis of literature’s affective energy is a
necessary correlative to our views concerning its historical impact,
whether it is focused on the subject or on the material world it inhabits.
Ever since at least Romanticism, we understand the exploration and
expression of emotion (‘emotion recollected in tranquility’ as Wordsworth
famously put it) to be one of the determining concerns of the literary.15Yet,
when it comes to our criticism of it, we are still beholden to the so-called
‘affective fallacy’ and forget or ignore that emotion and affect – feelings,
more broadly construed – are an integral part of the literary experience.
To be sure, recent criticism tends to no longer focus exclusively on the
‘poem itself’, attending instead to the historical, cultural, and material
contexts within which it exists. The programmatic reversal is well-nigh
symmetrical: Here is Wimsatt and Beardsely in 1959: ‘The Affective
Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and
what it does)’;16 here is Lynch and Warner in 1996: novel studies have
shifted ‘from refining the definition of the novel as a literary type to
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understanding how novels produce social divisions: from what a novel is to
what novels do’.17 Other than for its irony, this state of affairs would in
itself be of little theoretical interest if it were not for the fact that the
turn of the critical tide has washed away affect along with the ‘poem
itself’ and, as a result, our account of literature’s cultural work constitutes
a different sort of ‘affective fallacy’. The problem is not, or not only, that
affect is now considered to be an inconsequential or embarrassing or non-
essential attribute of literature, a sort of vestigial appendage condemned to
desuetude by the New Critical vocabulary we still employ; the problem is
that the claims we routinely make about literature’s historical impact
assume but fail to acknowledge the cultural value of affect, which,
though admittedly hard to quantify, is not a negligible factor in a work’s
popular appeal. Dickens’s ‘sentimentality’, for example, is more likely to
be dismissed as an artistic shortcoming than submitted to the critical scru-
tiny that its success as a novelistic device would surely merit if viewed in the
context of the massive public it addressed.
Critical resistance to considering the sensation novel as an eventful genre
no doubt stems to some degree from this state of affairs, but the immediacy
of its corporeal appeal (closer to affect than to emotion in this respect) makes
visible another unexamined assumption underlying our dismissal of feeling
in literature: its subjectivity. The novel gives meaning and shape to the
notion of interiority, but emotion, which together with thought, belief,
and imagination constitute something like the four cardinal points on the
map of novelistic interiority, is not seriously taken into consideration
when criticism, no less than the novel itself, makes the claim that its cultural
work entails the production of subjects. The point to be made is that the
claims of literary historians about the novel’s role in the formation of the
subject very rarely take into consideration what I have called literature’s
eventness, an eventness that sensation fiction makes particularly evident.
Instead, these claims are more often than not supported by appealing,
directly or indirectly, to Foucault’s disciplinary model, a model whose fun-
damental principles, visibility and self-regulation, are taken to be represen-
tational rather than performative. Careful readers of Foucault have noted
that the principle of subjectification (assujettissement) operates under a discur-
sive regime that puts into place limits on what can and cannot be said and
that this form of censorship becomes a condition of possibility of subject for-
mation. For novel critics, however, it is the novel’s robust representational
program that provides a suitable setting for showing how discipline works
in a culture of surveillance and, in doing so, serves as an effective mechanism
for achieving it.18 This model, which seems to conform more to the novel’s
program of representation than to Foucault’s own formulations, fails in any
case to take into account the role that the novel’s non-representational, non-
figurative, non-referential aspects might play in these processes.
Mario Ortiz-Robles Figure and Affect in Collins
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Affect (understood as corporeal sensation of the type elicited by the
sensation novel) belongs to the non-representational dimensions of the
novel, and is thus, as I hope to show in what follows, a crucial element
in our understanding of the novel’s mechanisms of subject formation.
Affect characterizes a non-subjective element within the subject that,
because it is involuntary and mechanical, tends to disrupt or undo subjec-
tivity (understood as intentional, cognitive, emotional). And since affect
drives the subject to its undoing (not precisely an Artaudian body-
without-organs, but rather a body-as-organ, a raw nerve), it also establishes
the conditions of possibility for the subject to be posited as an event, what-
ever the determinations (phenomenological, psychological, even physio-
logical) such subject-event might accrue in the process of its subsequent
novelizations. Affect acts as a form of utterance that posits its subsequent
novelization as emotion; affect speaks, as Betteredge’s phrase suggests,
‘(with my heart in my mouth)’.
The theoretical description of sensation in sensation fiction thus bears
a double valence: on the one hand, the eventfulness of the genre points in
the direction of corporeal affect as the privileged narrative instantiation of
emotion in the novel; on the other, the novelistic project, understood in a
general sense as the narrative elaboration of an emotional subject or a
subject of emotion, undergoes in the case of sensation fiction a hyperbolic
reinscription that makes visible the very mechanisms of its production as
effects upon the body. Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White is particularly
well suited to carry out such a description because, in staging an allegory of
subject constitution in the form of an elaborate mystery plot involving a
woman-in-white, the novel also allegorizes its own production as The
Woman in White and, in doing so, offers one of the most dramatic
instances we have of subject formation as a species of novelization. In
this respect, Collins’s novel is rather like an excessive melodramatic
staging of Paul de Man’s famous definition of prosopopeia as an endless
process whereby ‘the dead are made to have a face and a voice which
tells the allegory of their demise and allows us to apostrophize them in
our turn’.19
The touch
The narrative of Collins’s The Woman in White begins with the touch of a
hand:
I had mechanically turned in this latter direction, and was strolling
along the lonely high-road – idly wondering, I remember, what
the Cumberland young ladies would look like – when, in one
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moment, every drop of blood in my body was brought to a stop by
the touch of a hand laid lightly and suddenly on my shoulder from
behind me. (p. 20)
The speaker, Walter Hartright, is returning to London after spending an
evening in the suburbs at his mother’s home when he is suddenly
touched from behind by a woman dressed in white. This singular event
is the point of departure for a narrative, the balance of whose energies
will be directed towards discovering the identity of the woman who has
just touched the narrator, as well as the events that have led her do so.
To the extent that the episode brings together for the first time disparate
elements (a woman dressed in white, the road, the Cumberland ladies, a
touch), their juxtaposition or co-incidence introduces an enigma or
riddle that sets into motion, in the manner of Shklovsky, a multiplicity
of possible solutions only one of which will turn out to be correct.20
The fact that the event that inaugurates the narrative takes place at a cross-
roads in the middle of the night suggests as much: Hartright has ‘mechani-
cally turned’ into a narrative crossroads of sorts where a number of possible
pathways that had up to this point remained separate merge into one as
though they were themselves roads converging on London. Indeed, the
story of Walter Hartright and his family, the story of the ‘Cumberland
young ladies’ about whom he is thinking as he is touched from behind,
and the story of the-woman-white who touches him will henceforth
overlap and criss-cross each other as the novel inexorably advances
towards what Shklovsky calls the ‘true ending’.
But the narrative also begins by stopping. The event of touching
arrests the narrator’s physiology: ‘every drop of blood in my body was
brought to a stop’. The touch thus inaugurates a narrative sequence
whose agent, the narrator Walter Hartright, is in fact paralyzed and thus
presumably unable to generate the narrative that he is nevertheless relating.
Affect in this case does not seem to operate as a narrative principle, but
rather as a stick in its wheel. The figure of the crossroads can be made to
yield, in this context, not the convergence of different narrative strands,
but rather the interruption of two different discursive orders: an order of
representation that captures events and submits them to interpretation
(the solution to an enigma) and an order of performance whereby the
event being represented (the touch) impinges on the body as an involuntary
sensation that stops narrative flow. The stop–start movement of this inau-
gural episode is thus also the material trace of the event, or, better, the
eventness, of the touch, which is registered at the level of narrative as a
‘coincidence’ with long-term storytelling consequences while, at the level
of affect, it is experienced as a short-lived moment whose sheer corporeality
renders it inaccessible to narrative interpretation.
Mario Ortiz-Robles Figure and Affect in Collins
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Novelistic entropy tends to decrease as the narrative progresses and
thus it is not surprising that representational stability and plot re-align-
ment become dominant in a system that might otherwise direct its
expendable, non-narrative energy towards its own undoing. Nevertheless,
the equivocal nature of the inaugural event – the touch is at once consta-
tive and performative, embodied and discursive, cognitive and affective,
prolonged and instantaneous– extends across the episode it anchors,
becoming formalized in a double configuration that corresponds, at least
on the level of its telling, to a recurring pattern of iterations. The first
of these configurations is the conventional speech act, which is themati-
cally elaborated in the novel in its legal determinations (wills, deeds,
certificates, depositions, etc.) but also operates without institutional
validation in everyday situations. The second is the woman-in-white as
rhetorical figure, which, in a novel whose truth claims are premised on
the forensic exposition of the ‘case’ of the woman in white, becomes the
focus of narrative attention.
The first instance in the novel of a formalized speech act occurs when
the woman-in-white asks Hartright to promise to not interfere. The
promise is staged in the form of repetition, with the woman-in-white
asking Hartright ‘will you promise?’ on three separate occasions:
As she repeated the words for the third time, she came close to me,
and she laid her hand, with a sudden gentle stealthiness, on my
bosom – a thin hand; a cold hand (when I removed it with mine)
even on that sultry night. Remember that I was young; remember
that the hand which touched me was a woman’s.
‘Will you promise?’
‘Yes.’
One word! The little familiar word that is on everybody’s lips, every
hour in the day. Oh me! And I tremble, now, when, I write it. (p. 23)
The passage restages the event of the touch, but this time the response,
rather than being bodily (‘every drop of blood in my body was brought
to a stop’), is entirely verbal (‘One word!’). Since the touch of the
woman-in-white upon the narrator’s body seals a promissory contract,
the verbal act opens a temporal gap between the instant in which the
promise is made and the moment in which it will be fulfilled, creating
the conditions of possibility of narrative itself since the outcome is at
this stage unknown. The narrative possibilities of the promise differ
from those of the riddle in which the solution is known in advance (it is
the contractual basis of the promise) and therefore its elaboration does
not proceed by eliminating wrong solutions until it reaches its ‘true
ending’. Instead, the promise plot follows a pre-established path even as
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no guarantees exist that it will be brought to its terminus: as we all know, to
make a promise is not by any means the same as keeping it.
The substitution of verbal for affective responses in the second staging
of the touch confirms that affect in sensation fiction has performative force
and is thus endowed with the power to both stop and start the narrative. In
this passage, affect has been transposed to the act of writing, occurring no
longer as a response to the woman-in-white’s touch (it is only ‘cold’ in
this passage) but rather as a consequence of writing: ‘And I tremble, now,
when I write it’. At a thematic level, the relation between writing and sen-
sation is straightforward: the memory of his first encounter with the
woman-in-white triggers an affective response. But the temporal ambiguity
of the period suggests a different reading: the present of ‘now’ is extended by
a ‘when’ that implies an imperfect present in which ‘trembling’ has become a
condition of utterance as such. When we consider that Hartright’s narrative
is, like the other narratives in a novel that is told from the perspective ofmul-
tiple first-person narrators, a quasi-legal document that is used to solve the
mystery of the-woman-in-white, we realize that ‘writing’, in addition to
being the medium of narrative, is also a performative operation with the
power to accomplish things in its fictional setting. Each of the individual
narratives functions as a kind of deposition or affidavit: ‘the story here pre-
sentedwill be told bymore than one pen, as the story of an offense against the
laws is told in Court by more than one witness’ (p. 5). The ‘trembling’
Hartright experiences in or by writing is therefore something like a perfor-
mative affect that leaves a material trace in the world. The inscription in the
signature that would seal and underwrite such a document, tells us as much:
‘Hartright’ can be read as ‘someone with the heart in the right place’ or as
‘someone who writes from the heart’, or perhaps ‘of the heart’ (as in, say,
‘playwright’); in any case, it can be read as a literalization of affective utter-
ance, like the phrase ‘with my heart in my mouth’.
The link established between affect and performance in the practice of
writing in this early scene is operative in the novel as a whole, articulating
the complex plot structure and informing the thematic development of
subject formation in the figure of the-woman-in-white. Indeed, writing
appears in a remarkable variety of forms: individual depositions by
major and minor characters, letters, extended excerpts from Marian’s
private diary, Fosco’s postscript to it (p. 343), scribbled notes, Sir Percival’s
writing on the sand (p. 240), wills, entry books, forgeries, title deeds,
Laura’s signature (p. 250), marriage entries, death certificates, medical cer-
tificates, Fosco’s confession, a tombstone (p. 414), the letter T carved on
Fosco’s flesh (p. 640), and so on. Writing, as this partial list suggests,
has the ability to determine the identity of characters and to seal their
fate even if its instrumentality is at all times contingent and positional.
As is well known, conventional speech acts are brought off successfully
Mario Ortiz-Robles Figure and Affect in Collins
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when a number of fairly simple conditions are fulfilled, but in a novel
remarkable for its treatment of duplicity, secrecy, and revenge this turns
out to be an enormously difficult task to accomplish. It is no wonder
that Walter Hartright, with an evident sense of relief, is able to declare
at the end of the narrative, ‘I now had in my possession all the papers
that I wanted’ (p. 631), as though closure could only be achieved by ful-
filling all the conditions necessary for bringing off writing’s performative
potential and this alone could control affect’s disruptive performance.
Affect in the novel seems to be impervious to institutional determinations
(narratives of interiority, at any rate, are premised on the autonomy of sen-
sation), yet the imbrication of affective with performative events in the nar-
rative suggests that the force of one is inseparable from the force of the
other. But the law of forces in the novel – its physics or biophysics – is
such that they can only appear as disruptions of established norms, reac-
tions to previous forces, the indirect effects of words and deeds, all reab-
sorbed into an order of representation that thematizes these as ‘incident’
only the better to affirm the normalcy of sensible emotion.
The second formalization of the event that brings order and stability
to the novel’s representational program is, fittingly, an unconventional
figure: the woman-in-white. A rhetorical trope serves as the ground for a
narrative system that privileges experience and, in this case, offers its
own blankness or emptiness as a placeholder for subjectivity as such.
The identity of the woman dressed in white, whom Hartright meets on
his way home, appears as a riddle to be solved not only because it invites
narrative speculation: Who? Why? Where? How? It is also a riddle in
that it stands in for speculation as a blank slate, a ghostly form, a
‘woman-in-white’; which amounts to saying that she is a figure for
figure. Consider the first description Hartright gives us of her:
There, in the middle of the broad, bright high-road – there, as if it
had that moment sprung out of the earth or dropped from the
heaven – stood the figure of a solitary Woman, dressed from head
to foot in white garments; her face bent in grave inquiry on mine,
her hand pointing to the dark cloud over London, as I faced her.
(p. 20)
This initial description, along with the few details Hartright next furnishes
– colourless face, large eyes, nervous lips – is of no help in the task of spe-
cifying what she is like, much less in identifying her in a legal setting, and
this despite the fact that the road is ‘bright’, that they are standing at most
at arm’s length from each other, and that they are facing each other atten-
tively (in ‘grave inquiry’). The absence of an adequate referent to the
woman-in-white makes of this figure an instance of catachresis, a figure
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that comes into being through, indeed constitutes, an act of positing. This
is confirmed by the manner in which Hartright attempts to make sense of
her surprising appearance – ‘sprung out of the earth’, ‘dropped from
heaven’ – as though she in fact had no previous referent whatsoever. As
catachresis, the figure of the-woman-in-white is functionally capable of
resisting allegorical determinations (say, for instance, ‘bride’) but, as an
empty subject position, it can also accommodate them in an iterative
series: Laura Fairlie, Anne Catherick, and, by extension, ‘Woman’, as
such. The positing force of the catachrestic figure ‘the-woman-in-white’
can thus be said to incite the adoption or assumption, in the narrative for-
malization of its mystery, the form of the traditional tropes metaphor and
metonymy and their substitutive logic (resemblance and contiguity; displa-
cement and condensation; and so on). It is for this reason, as we shall see
later in greater detail, that the figure of the-woman-in-white also functions
as a mechanism or dispositif of confinement. Regardless of the narrative
outcome, the different iterations of the figure of the woman-in-white in
the novel would alone suggest that its force of positing is performative
in the stop–start manner of the touch.
The touch, to return to the novel’s primal or, at any rate, inaugural
scene, registers this double valence in the manner in which the usage trans-
forms its syntactic function. In the opening passage, mere lines away from
the use of ‘touch’ as a noun, there appears the following phrase: ‘the lone-
liness and helplessness of the woman touched me’ (p. 22). The passage
between the physical action of touching and the noun, touch, is straight-
forward; the juxtaposition of ‘touched’ as emotion with ‘touched’ as phys-
ical contact is not. It constitutes, within the figural economy of the passage,
a syntactical slippage of the sort we find in the figure of anacoluthon: it
makes grammatical sense but shifts the tropological register by making
the physical act (the touch) a figure for emotion (I’m touched). The
force of anacoluthon is therefore disruptive of the referential structure
within which it operates and, like catachresis, performs a verbal operation
that transcends or at any rate interrupts mimetic substitution. The discur-
sive force of anacoluthon, in this case, creates a curious result: there is no
logical distance separating cause (physical touch) from its effect (touching).
Affect, this is to say, is a material event. In her book Touching Feeling, Eve
Sedgwick coins the term ‘periperformative’ to designate a species of speech
act that is not strictly performative, but which nevertheless operates ‘in the
neighborhood’ of the performative. She proposes such terminology so as to
offer a spatial, rather than a temporal, procedure for isolating performative
speech acts in literature.21 It is not clear what analytical advantages this has
over the Austinian nomenclature, since in the end they still depend on
institutional determinations. Jacques Derrida’s more radical reading of per-
formativity (neatly encapsulated in the slogan ‘materiality without matter’)
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would in all likelihood, though not without some effort, accommodate the
notion of periperformative as a condition of performativity itself: language
as such is the neighbourhood of the performative and iterability a species of
house-swapping. Sedgwick’s attempt to mark affect with performative
force is nevertheless welcome insofar as it brings into focus the production
of affect as a non-institutional event of and in language. Under the rubric
of the periperfomative, therefore, we can place the figurative force of
the touch/touch substitution as an event that transforms the subject by
producing affect.
The production of affect in the novel follows discursive paths that
criss-cross and interrupt each other as the narrative progresses. The two for-
malizations of the event I have been tracing thus far – the promise as con-
ventional speech act and the-woman-in-white as figure – are themselves
equivocal, oscillating between a performative order of acts and a constative
system of description in an undecidable as well as necessary pattern of
mutual implication. In both cases, we are approaching an originary or
even pre-originary synthesis without which there would be no inscription,
no materiality, no affect, no body. Indeed, the striking co-incidence, at the
level of the novel’s discourse, of the figure of the woman-in-white and the
performance of a speech act, a co-incidence already occurring in the event
of the touch itself through the affect it elicits, is all the more astonishing
in that it is only the first instance in the novel of a general pattern whose
recurrence, as we shall see, has wide-ranging implications for the thematics
of identity and subject formation in which it is implicated. The extended
episode of the touch puts into motion or inaugurates a narrative trajectory
that features, as the fundamental mechanism of its movement, the stop–
start oscillation of constative and performative registers that brings the
subject of the narrative, the-woman-in-white, in and out of being.
Consider the following iterations. In one, we find Marian reading one
of her mother’s letters to Walter in which the ‘accidental resemblance’
between Anne Catherick and Laura is first made manifest. In the mean-
time, Laura, dressed in a ‘snowy muslin dress’ (p. 58), paces back and
forth under the moon before the glass doors that open onto the terrace.
The reading of the letter is interrupted every time Laura passes before
them, creating in the process a suggestive parallelism between the subject
of the letter and the woman walking outside. The force of this interruption
is productive of sensation, which is itself a repetition of the originary affect
that has set the narrative in motion:
I started up from the ottoman, before Miss Halcombe could
pronounce the next words. A thrill of the same feeling which ran
through me when the touch was laid upon my shoulder on the
lonely high-road, chilled me again. (p. 60)
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When Walter is finally made aware, following a number of further inter-
ruptions, that even after many years Laura and Anne Catherick are still
remarkably similar, it is as though he had been touched again by the-
woman-in-white: ‘There stood Miss Fairlie, a white figure, alone in the
moonlight; in her attitude, in the turn of her head, in her complexion,
in the shape of her face, the living image, at that distance and under
those circumstances, of the woman in white!’ (pp. 61–62).
The figure of the woman-in-white is doubled not only by virtue of
being a representation, but also because it is a representation of the inter-
changability of Laura and Anne Catherick, each of whom can come to
occupy the blank (white?) subject position it comes to signify. Indeed,
the figure often appears without apparent referent: ‘Again the chance refer-
ence to the woman in white!’ (p. 73), and, again, ‘Anne Catherick again!’
(p. 74), and, again, ‘Again, and yet, again, the woman in white. There was a
fatality in it’ (p. 75). The insistence of the reference seems to bring her into
being as figure, as though she were reaching across the space that separates
them so as to touch him again. It is not until Walter finally sees Anne
Catherick again in the flesh that the figure ceases, at least for the
moment, to be a figure (her white dress is in fact now covered by a blue
cloak). And, yet, no sooner is figure arrested by the presence of Anne
Catherick than the bodily event that sets off the figural proliferation of
the woman-in-white as figure is itself iterated: ‘It was a welcome interrup-
tion to be roused by feeling Anne Catherick’s hand laid on my shoulder.
The touch was as stealthy and as sudden as that other touch which had pet-
rified me from head to foot on the night when we had first met’ (p. 97).
The repetition of the event of touching makes Walter return to the
stop–start movement of the initial occasion, but, instead of producing
an affect that sets off a chain of tropological displacements that extends
the figure of the woman-in-white into the narrative, the touch is, in this
case, ‘welcome’ because it has roused him from his own thought process
as he tries to make sense of Anne Catherick’s resemblance to Laura. The
interruption of the touch has come at a critical moment of his reflections
in which he has realized that Anne Catherick’s face is a ‘worn weary’
version of Laura’s: ‘If ever sorrow and suffering set their profaning
marks on the youth and beauty of Miss Fairlie’s face, then, and then
only, Anne Catherick and she would be the twin-sisters of chance resem-
blance, the living reflections of one another’ (p. 97). The difference
between the first touch, which produces the proliferating figure of the
woman-in-white, and the second, which seeks to arrest the rhetorical pro-
liferation of the figure by endowing it with identity, is also a difference of
affect insofar as Walter has fallen in love with Laura in the interim and is
therefore ‘touched’ by the resemblance in ways that he could not have been
‘touched’ before.
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These iterations, each an interlacing of performative forces and
constative hypostatizations, form part of an endless (or at least potentially
endless) chain of iterations in a tireless writing machine that produces text,
affect, and, as we shall now see, subject events. In the machine, the subject
is novelized into existence, bearing the burden of a presence (emotion,
intention, imagination, belief) that ceases to correspond to experience.
The subject is materialized over time in an iterative stop–start process
that is at once constative and performative as the posited ‘I’ is made to
fit into a narrative of continuity that would help mask its inexorable frag-
mentariness. The story of Anne Catherick and Laura Fairlie brings into
relief this predicament with particular poignancy not least because it is
the story of this predicament. If sensation is the fundamental narrative
unit in the story, it is so in part due to its eventness, but also because it reg-
isters the force of its own posting as a powerful and often violent affect.
Touche´!
In his book on the artist Francis Bacon, The Logic of Sensation, Gilles
Deleuze defines Figure as a non-figurative, non-narrative, non-illustrative
‘record of the fact’.22 According to Deleuze, there are two possible ways
of moving beyond the figurative: towards pure form, through abstraction;
or towards the purely figural, through extraction and isolation. The figural
is here opposed to the figurative: the figurative implies the relationship of
an image to other images in a narrative logic of illustration that corre-
sponds to the ‘realism’ of representation (this is the domain of the sensa-
tional or the cliche´). The figural, in contrast, escapes illustration by
means of narrative disruption, becoming quite literally a ‘matter of fact’
that acts immediately upon the nervous system. The violence of sensation
is registered not in the narrative representation of an act, but in the action
of invisible forces upon the body that cause Figure to tremble, twitch,
vibrate. The primary function of the Figure is thus to make these invisible
forces visible even as they remain inaccessible to the language of
representation.
It is tempting to equate Figure with the numerous monstrous or
monster-like figures that appear in realist fiction as though to provide an
epistemological counterweight to the normative project of subject consti-
tution that determines the novel’s social function. A quick roll-call of poten-
tial Figures in Victorian fiction – Heathcliff-as-animal, Bertha Mason,
Krook, Hyde, Dorian Gray, Dracula, etc. – suggests that those Figures
de-formed, dis-figured, and distorted by everyday acts of violence have
something in common that isolates them or extracts them from the narra-
tive order in which they exist: they are uneasily suspended within a field of
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reference constituted by the plots and counterplots that, in the normative
biographical progress of a novel’s character, legitimate the subject’s experi-
ence. Unable to gain access into the narrative structures to which they are
nevertheless confined, these characters are indescribable, unfathomable
within realism’s epistemological parameters, but not for all that less
material: the representational void they occupy is the place where language
acts, materially, in the world. The concealment of Figure within plot is a
testament to the violent nature of the forces that disfigure it insofar as nar-
rative aims to neutralize them by operating within spatial and temporal
coordinates that do not register them. Themarriage plot and the inheritance
plot are common narrative forms that give shape to experience; but, they
also happen to be regulated, as normative dispositifs, by the performative
speech acts that bring them about: ‘I do’; ‘I bequeath’; ‘I promise’;
perhaps ‘I am’. The infelicity of conventional speech acts is the condition
of possibility of narrative since stories are generated by frustrated marriages
or contested wills rather than by straightforward transactions premised on
consensus. Figure interrupts these plots, making them infelicitous, or,
more radically, rendering visible the intrinsic infelicity of the rites of
passage they formalize and the resulting violence with which they de-
form, dis-figure, or distort the subject.
Collins’s The Woman in White makes an invaluable contribution to
debates concerning subject formation by showing us that Figure is not
monstrous at all, or, better, that is monstrous but unexceptional. The
process of disfiguration by virtue of which the subject is deformed is in
fact the condition of possibility of subject formation in the first place. In
a narrative intent on restoring order and legitimating the norm, Figure
appears not as a ‘dark double’ that must be eliminated lest a ‘happy
ending’ be forever denied the heroine, who becomes so only by reason
of having reached it. On the contrary, the figure of the-woman-in-white
is Woman writ large (‘. . . the story of what a Woman’s patience can
endure . . .’, etc.) even as, and indeed because, it is an empty figure upon
which are inscribed the material traces of its various narrative
determinations.
Consider this iteration of Figure in the form of Anne Catherick:
The instant I risked that chance reference to the person who had put
her in the Asylum, she sprang up on her knees. A most extraordinary
and startling change passed over her. Her face, at all ordinary times so
touching to look at, in its nervous sensitiveness, weakness, and uncer-
tainty, became suddenly darkened by an expression of maniacally
intense hatred and fear, which communicated a wild, unnatural
force to every feature. Her eyes dilated in the dim evening light,
like the eyes of a wild animal. (p. 104)
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The epistemological ambiguity of the Figure into which Anne Catherick is
here transformed, not quite human nor yet altogether animal, invites an
interpretive reading of the passage. To be sure, the animalization of
Anne Catherick is not a negligible aspect within the fraught gender politics
of the text – confinement, for one, is also a sort of caging – but consider
for a moment the semantic void this reading would, in offering an
interpretation of the-woman-in-white, attempt to fill: the use of animal
imagery marks a hesitation or difficultly in the novelistic project to
render Figure visible, as though taking account of her alterity were
beyond the novel’s representational abilities. In her ‘madness’, Anne
Catherick seems to act as a figure of or for unrepresentability as such,
remaining inaccessible, like the figure of the animal itself, to the mimetic
resources of the realist novel. The fact that her face is no longer ‘touching
to look at’ suggests that the association between the two formalizations I
analysed above – institutional speech acts and the woman-in-white as a
recurring rhetorical figure – are no longer sufficient to capture (as in
arrest) the material forces that violently produce her. The aberrant or
inadequate Figure becomes a ‘record of fact’ that is violently inscribed in
and as a subject-event, a non-narrative, non-representational form of
subjectivity that emerges at the intersection of the novel’s structures of
reference.
Figure returns later in the same scene at the mention of the name ‘Sir
Percival Glyde’, who, Walter concludes, must be the person who has impri-
soned her: ‘The instant I pronounced that name she started to her feet, and
a scream burst from her that rang through the churchyard, and made my
heart leap in me with the terror of it. The dark deformity of the expression
which had just left her face lowered on it once more, with doubled and
trebled intensity’ (p. 105). The touch has been replaced with a name, an
utterance, a shriek, in short, a verbal or pre-verbal act that arrests Walter
(makes his heart leap, presumably, up to his mouth) but produces no
chain of signification, no rhetorical proliferation, no iterability of speech
acts; it exposes the sheer materiality of the force with which these acts
(of speech, of sound) impinge upon the human body.
It is a particular merit of D.A. Miller’s remarkable reading of The
Woman in White to have identified confinement as a condition of possi-
bility of gendered, familial subjectivity. For Miller, the description of the
‘feminine carceral’ as a form of escape through madness of the social con-
straints under which women were forced to live in the nineteenth century is
insufficient to account for the ‘terrific male aggression’ that leads to con-
finement. The best way to read the figure of the madwoman, writes
Miller, ‘would be to not derive the diagnosis from her social psychology
(“Who wouldn’t go crazy under such conditions?”) but rather to derive
her psychology from her diagnosis: from the very category of madness
Textual Practice
856
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Or
ti
z-
Ro
bl
es
, 
Ma
ri
o]
 A
t:
 0
0:
57
 2
1 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
that, like fate, lies ever in wait to “cover” – account for and occlude –
whatever behaviors, desires, or tendencies might be considered socially
deviant, undesirable, or dangerous’ (p. 169). Nor is the option of
reading the carceral as ‘aversion therapy’ designed to ‘redirect men’s
desire for men onto women’ particularly persuasive. For Miller, it is the
Oedipal family triangle upon which the novel finally settles that best
describes the ideology of confinement insofar as it configures desire as a
rivalry whose violence is all the more aggressive for being compulsory.
But the Oedipal triangle is only the last in a long series of structures of
confinement that occur, indeed structure, the text and which include, at the
thematic level, not only the Asylum, but also, among others, Mr Fairlie’s
room, Marian’s sick room, Blackwater, Welmingham Church, and even
Laura’s grave. It would be misleading to equate these structures with the
iterative mechanisms of sensation I call subject events as though they
were analogues or figures for socially determined institutional spaces of
discipline. They are not in fact analogues. Subject events are themselves
structures of confinement whose discursive or verbal nature does not
imply a reduced sphere of action. The undecidability of the performa-
tive–constative doublet applies across the spectrum, from the microscopic
reading of a word (say, ‘touch’) to the telescopic reading of plot patterns
and cultural materials. It is for this reason that Figure is a more apt concep-
tual term than the categories traditionally used, under the general rubric of
representation, to describe the violent event of becoming-subject.
According to Deleuze, Bacon isolates his Figures within oval areas or
parallelepipeds so as ‘to avoid the figurative, illustrative, and narrative char-
acter Figure would necessarily have if it were not isolated’ (p. 6, emphases
in original). This form of confinement makes visible the forces that operate
beyond or despite or instead of constative determinations. In this scheme,
the subject comes into being not because it is isolated, as a Foucauldian
reading might assume, but rather because in isolation the forces that con-
tribute to its becoming are visible. The violence with which subject-events
are constituted is disfiguring, but not because that is the price we must pay
in order to become who we are. This is Dorian Gray’s negative capability.
The reason’s are material and have to do with physics, not metaphysics.
Pressure, dilation, contraction, flattening, elongation, and compression
are applications of force, not outcomes. The deformations to which they
give rise register the violence with which force is applied, but they are
not alchemical transformations. Anne Catherick and Laura Fairlie may
resemble each other, but this is a random occurrence, an ‘accidental resem-
blance’, as Laura’s mother puts it. They do not turn into each other by dint
of, say, wearing each other’s clothes. This is a ‘figurative, illustrative, or nar-
rative’ elaboration of resemblance which Fosco and Sir Percival exploit,
but, they are able to do so because, as criminals, they understand violence.
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Balzac’s Vautrin, for instance, is unrivaled in the obscure art of impersona-
tion, but his notorious birthmark is a constant reminder that any ‘birth’
leaves its ‘mark’ upon the body and that, though it deforms it, the body
remains the same no matter how violent the forces we apply to it.
Madness is the name the novel gives to the deformations of Figure when
it is subjected to invisible social forces. It is one of the story’s cruellest ironies
that it is in the Asylumwhere identity is most stable. That this stability is what
guarantees involuntary forms of confinement only confirms that, as an insti-
tution, it is a repository of identity. Confinement, as Foucault reminds us, has
is roots in the conceptualization of the police as a force charged with disciplin-
ing subjects into fulfilling productive roles in society.23 In a novel in which the
police plays no role, the policing function devolves upon the characters
themselves. To be sure, self-regulation, as the narrative strategy of multiple
narrators suggests, works by the principle of visibility, but, since each narrator
also performs acts in the practice of writing, one can say that self-policing also
operates through the principle of mutual violence. Fosco’s ‘postscript’ to
Marian’s diary, which Miller reads as a form of ‘rape’, illustrates the point
forcefully. It is finally the social violence of the letter that becomes visible in
the production of affect, a violence that the novel, pre-eminently invested in
illustration, does its violent best to hide through sentiment, emotion, and
sensationalism.
Accounts of the novel’s role in the production of subjectivities have
very often relied on mechanistic models of social discipline that, while use-
fully foregrounding the power of representations to shape its readers, who,
unable to predict and much less control the effects of reading, fall under its
influence, have rarely taken into consideration the discursive conditions of
subject formation that render the realist novel into a peculiarly unreliable
structure of address. The novel’s power to influence, persuade, coerce, or
otherwise shape its readers is of course an ability often promoted by the
novel itself, from Don Quijote to Madame Bovary, and beyond. Novel
critics may well disagree as to the specific mechanism of subjectification
to which the novel submits its readers, some preferring the self-regulating
techniques of ‘discipline’ over the mechanized procedures of ‘interpella-
tion’ as a schematics of explanation, but the novel’s role in the constitution
of the subject does not in the main differ since all these models rely on, and
are figures for, the assumed representational efficacy of the novel, whose
agency, like that of state apparatuses, the power/knowledge doublet, or
the psychic drives, we have no choice but to consider as unremitting,
implacable, and universal. But even if we invoke the names of Foucault,
Althusser, or Lacan to describe the novel’s participation in processes of
subject formation so as to include the broader cultural arena in which
the novel lives, the operative assumption is still the same: the novel
serves as a conduit or relay of institutional, ideological, or psychic forces
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that act upon the subject and over which it can exercise little or no control.
These accounts leave out the possibility that the novel is itself an event
capable of effecting some of the discursive alterations that contribute to
the subject’s subjectification.
In the preceding argument, I have taken this possibility seriously by
suggesting that the subject is materialized in and by the novel, considering
it not as some undesirable yet inevitable by-product of reading, but rather
as an event of narrative in its own right. My intention has been to show that
no account of subjectivity in the novel can usefully proceed without con-
sidering the performativity of novelistic discourse and the equivocal nature
of the subject to which it gives rise. The passage between the history the
novel represents and the history it performs (its historicity, as such)
encounters a disjunction or shift of registers between fact and act as two
different linguistic orders (constative and performative) interrupt each
other and create a disruption in the novel’s structures of reference. If I
have focused on only one such node – the performance of Affect – I
have done so because it is an eventful phenomenon and not necessarily
because it is unique. The writing machine produces texts with extremely
varied configurations of performative and constative, representational
and non-referential, discursive acts. In fact, all the cognitive effects we
have traditionally ascribed to the novel – its mode of address, its appeal
to the senses, its style of thought; in short, its whole structure of
feeling – are in no straightforward sense strictly attributable to its
powers of representation, formidable as these often prove to be. Many of
the attributes we use to novelize the subject – voice, intention, gender,
imagination, and, in the present reading, affect – can be traced back to
the non-representational, non-figural, non-referential forces of novelistic
discourse; they can be found in the violent force of the performativity
that installs them as essential predicates of existence.
University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
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description, see Lyn Pykett, ‘Collins and the Sensation Novel’ in The
Mario Ortiz-Robles Figure and Affect in Collins
859
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Or
ti
z-
Ro
bl
es
, 
Ma
ri
o]
 A
t:
 0
0:
57
 2
1 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
Cambridge Companion to Wilkie Collins (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), pp. 50–64. Ann Cvetkovich pursues the question of how
affect is produced in sensation fiction, but her analysis remains within the
narrative parameters established by the novel: formal mechanisms of sensation
such as surprise and suspense work to consolidate male power. See ‘The
Economy of Sensation and The Woman in White’, Novel, 23 (1988),
pp. 24–43.
3 See Pykett, p. 50.
4 See Lillian Nayder, ‘Collins and Empire’ in The Cambridge Companion to
Wilkie Collins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 139–
152; Nicholas Daly, ‘Railway Novels: Sensation Fiction and the Moderniz-
ation of the Senses’, English Literary History 66 (1999), pp. 461–487; Nicholas
Dames, The Physiology of the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
5 See Deborah Wynne, The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family Magazine
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Graham Law, Serializing Fiction in the Victorian
Press (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2000); Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret
Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative and Nineteenth Century
Psychology (London: Routledge, 1988).
6 Margaret Oliphant, ‘Sensation Novels’, unsigned review in Blackwood’s
Edinburgh Magazine 19 (1862), pp. 564–584. (qtd. in Pykett).
7 H.L. Mansel, ‘Sensation Novels’, Quarterly Review, 113 (1863), p. 486.
8 Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White, ed. John Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford
World Classics, 1998), 3. [Hereafter cited parenthetically in the body of the
text.]
9 Wilkie Collins, The Moonstone, J.I.M. Stewart (ed.) (New York: Penguin,
1999), p. 27. [Hereafter cited parenthetically in text.]
10 It corresponds roughly to Todorov’s structuralist schematic concerning the
fantastic: ‘First, the text must oblige the reader to consider the world of the
characters as a world of living person and to hesitate between a natural and a
supernatural explanation of the events described. Second, this hesitation may
also be experienced by a character; thus the reader’s role is so to speak entrusted
to a character, and at the same time the hesitation is represented, it becomes
one of the themes of the work – in the case of naı¨ve reading, the actual
reader identifies himself with the character’. Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic,
trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 33.
11 Auguste Dupin’s famed thought processes in Poe’s stories, for instance, remain
inaccessible to the reader; we accept them for the effects they have on us rather
than for their value as thought.
12 Alison Winter encapsulates the physiological response readers reported after
reading The Woman in White in these terms: ‘the route from page to nerve
was direct’. With sensation fiction readers skipped the intermediary stage of
reflection, the ‘as if’ of conjecture. SeeMesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian
Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 324.
13 Betteredge is of course a reader as well as a detective and, by looking for clues in
Robinson Crusoe that might help him explain his current dilemmas, he confuses
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19 Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984), p. 122.
20 See Viktor Shklovsky, Energy of Delusion: A Book on Plot, trans. Shushan
Avagyan (Champaign: Dalkey Archive, 2007), p. 91.
21 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity
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